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1 Introduction
Since 1995, Europe has stopped closing the gap with the U.S. Growth has
been faster in America as it reaped the benefits of full employment and new
information technologies. Europe is worried about its aging population, its
ability to adapt to technical change, the burden of its welfare state and
the pains of labor market deregulation. Among the worries is the fear that
it might be losing its most talented workers to the United States. Stories
about succesfull expatriates in the Silicon valley or at top academic places
abound. Many European politicians and businessmen now complain that
they cannot compete because of taxes and regulations in order to attract the
best workers1.
This paper provides some evidence about the brain drain from Europe
to the US2. It uses US census data for 1990 and 2000 to measure the char-
acteristics of European expatriates and see how they fare in the US labor
market.
The data confirm the presumption that the skill composition of expatri-
ates is much better than in the source countries. The quantitative significance
of that, however, is open to debate, as the total number of expatriates ranges
between 0.5 and 1 % of the population. If one takes the view that labor is
a small number of homogeneous inputs, such as skilled labor and unskilled
labor, then our back-of-the envelope computations suggests a moderate ad-
verse effect of the brain drain on inequality and income in home countries,
with say a 2-3 % increase in the relative wage of the skilled and a 0.5-0.7 %
decline in GDP per capita. On the other hand, if one assumes that labor is
not a collection of homogeneous inputs, but instead that very talented in-
1See for example the François-Poncet (1999), Mahroum (1999)..
2See Becker et al. (2002) for an analysis of the brain drain from Italy to the rest of
Europe.
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dividuals are crucial for innovation, business formation, and management3,
the loss could be considerably bigger, but it is much harder to estimate (An
interesting first step is Zucker et al. (2003)). My speculative extrapolations
suggest that the proportion of European people who ”matter”, who are in
the U.S. could be as high as 50 %; that is huge and can in principle have
dramatic consequences on Europe’s growth potential—while such a number
can be disputed, casual observation suggests that in my field (research in
economics), it is about right.
2 Data
The data I use is the U.S. census, for years 1990 and 2000. I look at the
demographic and economic characteristics of Europeans living in the U.S. in
both samples. Using both years can in principle tell us interesting things
about the dynamics of the brain drain.
The only difficulty in using census data to learn about the expatriates
is how to define them. Citizenship is clearly not a very good indicator, as
many expatriates have US citizenship. We prefer to use the country of birth
as our defining variable, It is not immune to criticism either especially as it
includes people born to american parents abroad, children of US soldiers, and
so forth, However, we assume that this is a reasonably small group and it is
not a prior expected to bias the results in any significant direction. We limit
the analysis to five continental countries (Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, and
Germany) plus the United Kingdom, which we expect to follow a different
logic given its historical ties and community of language with the United
States.
3Stephan and Levin (1999) document the exceptional contributions to US science by
foreign-born researchers.
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3 Basic demographics
Table 1 reports the number of citizens born in each of the six countries we
look at and aged between 25 and 64 (thereafter refered to as ”working age”)
in the two US censuses, and what share of the working age-population in
the country of origin they amount to. These fractions vary between a small
0.36 % in Spain to 1.66 % in the UK. That suggests that the macreconomic
effects of the brain drain are not likely to be very large, but they need not
be insignificant either.
If the distribution of workers characteristics is the same among emigrants
as in the home country labor force, emigration just reduces the size of the
home country labor force homothetically, with no effects on wages in the
long run, and a positive effect in the short run as there is more capital per
capita in the source country. However, if some groups are disproportionately
represented among expatriates, emigration may have non negligible effects
on the structure of wages. Suppose, for example, that we have two types of
workers, skilled (H) and unskilled (L), and that initially the skilled account
for 10 % of employment but get 30 % of total income. With a Cobb-Douglas
production function, that would imply4 Y = AHαL1−α, with α = 0.3 and
H/L = 1/9. Now, if 1 % of the population goes abroad and 30 % of them
are skilled, the H/L ratio falls by some 2.2 %. That means that the wage
gap between the skilled and the unskilled in the home country will go up by
2.2 % too, with 1 0.66 % wage reduction for the unskilled and a 1.54 % wage
gain for the skilled. One also finds a 0.4 % drop in GDP per capita. That is
not huge, but not negligible either. If the exodus is now highly concentrated
among the skilled, say if all those who leave are skilled, the H/L will fall
by 10 %, and so will the relative wage of the unskilled, whose absolute wage
4That is the long-run production function, where capital is left to adjust and thus
ignored.
4
falls by 3 %, while that of the skilled goes up by 7 %. That is about the
upper bound of how the wage distribution can widen if a country loses 1 %
of its workforce. As for GDP per capita, it would then fall by 2.1 %.
A comparison between the two census years also reveals that the drain
is accelerating, but not dramatically; in all countries except Italy, a slightly
higher fraction of the home working age population is working in the US in
2000 than in 1990. In the case of Italy, a traditional source of low-skilled
immigrants, the faction is actually falling, reflecting the phasing out of low-
skilled migration from Italy to the United States. These number suggest
that there is no strong acceleration in the latter part of nineties, and that
the phenomenon is of the same order of magnitude as in the eighties.
1990 2000
Country Number % of home pop. Number % of home pop
Belgium 21561 0.45 22631 0.62
France 115245 0.4 133873 0.43
UK 450804 1.53 524922 1.656
Spain 57375 0.29 78061 0.36
Italy 344406 1.15 303685 0.93
Germany 657937 1.40 720555 1.54
Table 1 — The European born population aged 25-64 in the US.
In Table 2 we get more information by looking at the age distribution
of Europeans living in the US. We see that for France, the UK, Italy and
Germany, there are actually fewer workers aged 25-34 living in the United
States in 2000 than in 1990. In at least two of these cases (France and Ger-
many), it seems to be due to a burst of emigration from this group in the
1980s, as it represent an abnormally high share of the expatriate popula-
tion. Nevertheless, this fall in the number of expatriates in that age group
is somewhat paradoxical in light of the overall increase in the number of ex-
patriates. Conventional wisdom would suggest that (i) People go to the US
5
when young, (ii) there was more emigration from Europe to the US in the
1990s than in the 1980s, and (iii) there is substantial net return migration as
people get older. In fact, while entry of young workers seems to have fallen
in the 1990s relative to the 1980s (except for Belgium and Spain), there is
substantial entry of older workers in the 1980s, so that there is no evidence
of net return migration. There was enough of an inflow of migrants in the
older cohorts so as to offset the fall of migrants in the younger one. That is
clear from Table 3, which performs a cohort analysis, comparing the size of
an age group living in the US in 2000 with the size of that same cohort in
1990. The cohorts aged between 25 and 44 living in the US increased in size
in the 1990s, and even the 45-54 cohorts barely decreased. Of course, that
may hide a lot of two-way movements between Europe and the US. Yet, for
a policymaker who worries about the brain drain, that suggests that return
migration is on net not to be counted on; those who return are quite likely
to go back and definitive return is deferred to retirement time.
One can only speculate about why the younger age group has declined
in size at the same time as older groups have increased. The effect is too
large to be explained by a reduction in the size of the corresponding cohort
in the source country due to aging. A deterioration of foreign language skills
learned at school does not square with the fact that the effect is also observed
in the UK.
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25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Belgium 1990 4.7 (22.1) 6.3 (29.0) 4.6 (21.4) 5.9 (27.4)
2000 6.1 (27.1) 5.2 (22.8) 6.8 (30.1) 4.5 (19.9)
France 1990 47.7 (41.4) 25.7 (22.3) 19.6 (17) 22.3 (19.4)
2000 32.4 (24.2) 54.3 (40.7) 27.4 (20.5) 19.8 (14.8)
United Kingdom 1990 125.8 (27.9) 122.8 (27.2) 111.9 (24.8) 90.3 (20.0)
2000 117.9 (22.5) 163.4 (31.1) 130.1 (24.8) 113.6 (21.6)
Spain 1990 20.7 (36.1) 12.4 (21.7) 12.7 (22.1) 11.6 (20.1)
2000 27.6 (35.4) 25.0 (32) 13.7 (17.6) 11.8 (15.1)
Italy 1990 59.8 (17.4) 90.0 (26.1) 94.0 (27.3) 100.7 (29.2)
2000 39.4 (13.0) 71.4 (23.5) 96.8 (31.9) 96 (31.6)
Germany 1990 214.7 (32.6) 172.8 (26.3) 141.0 (21.4) 129.5 (19.7)
2000 176.9 (24.6) 236.0 (32.8) 170.3 (23.6) 137.3 (19.1)
Table 2—The age distribution of expatriates in 1990 and 2000
(thousands, percentage of US census expatriate population in parenthe-
ses)
Country Cohort in 2000
35-44 45-54 55-64
Belgium +10.6 +7.9 −2.2
France +13.8 +6.6 +1
United Kingdom +30.0 +7.0 +1.5
Spain +20.8 +10.5 -7.1
Italy +19.4 +7.6 +2.1
Germany +10.4 -0.9 -2.6
Table 3 — Inflows by cohorts
The next two tables compare the employment rates of expatriates with
those of other US residents as well as the unemployment rate in their countries
of birth. We find that for men, employment rates for European expatriates
are higher than average in the US labor market, and therefore substantially
higher than in their home countries. For women, the employment rate is
higher than in their home countries but lower than in the US labor market.
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These results are not surprising: one does not emigrate to a country like
the U.S. if one does not have good employment prospects there. But, to the
extent that it signals greater employability of expatriates relative to stayer,
that effect should also be added when computing the adverse effects of the
brain drain of GDP per capita.
1990 2000
US residents Home country US Home
Belgium 87.4 77.1 87.5 78.1
France 88.3 80.5 85.1 78.5
UK 89.7 84.2 87.5 82.2
Spain 85.4 79.5 80.8 80.2
Italy 83.6 81.4 76.7 75.9
Germany 88.4 80.1 85.5 77.4
USA 85.3 85.2
Table 4 — Employment rates, men
1990 2000
US residents Home country US Home
Belgium 55.0 44.3 61.7 57.5
France 61.8 57.4 65.9 62.5
UK 64.3 62.0 64.8 66.9
Spain 60.9 32.7 61.4 45.1
Italy 53.3 39.7 56.6 43.2
Germany 64.0 51.7 65.8 60.7
USA 66.1 70.2
Table 5 — Employment rates, women
4 Education
We now turn to the observable dimensions of worker quality, in particular
education. We are especially interested in highly skilled people, and therefore
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will focus on the most advanced degrees. Table 5 lists the share of expatriate
population with tertiary education. As can be seen, it is far larger than
in the US labor market at large and even larger than in the corresponding
home country. For example, in 2000, 56 % of French-born workers living in
the US had a college degree, against 21 % in France. Most remarkably, the
education level of the expatriates seems to have improved during the nineties
at an even higher pace than in the source countries, While the fraction of the
source population with a college degree increased by 9, 7, 10, 12, 7 and 11
points in Belgium, France, the UK, Spain, Italy, and Germany, respectively,
among expatriates it has gone up by 12, 14, 11, 14, 8, and 7 points. Thus
only in Germany does the home population level increase faster than for
expatriates.
1990 2000
US census Home country US census Home country
Belgium 47.6 17 59.6 26
France 42.7 14 56.1 24
UK 38.9 15 49.2 25
Spain 30.6 9 44.1 21
Italy 17.1 6 25.7 13
Germany 34.6 17 41.9 28
US 29.7 33.8
Table 6 — Fraction of the expatriate population with tertiary education,
vs. corresponding fraction in home country and whole US census.
These data confirm that the expatriates are heavily selected among the
most educated workers. This skewness increases when one moves up the skill
ladder. Table 7 reports the fraction of expatriates who have a Ph.D. and
compares it to the average US workers. Unfortunately, we do not have the
corresponding figures for the European countries, but they are unlikely to be
higher than in the United States.
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1990 2000
Belgium 4.33 5.78
France 3.1 4.9
UK 3.2 3.9
Spain 2.7 4.6
Italy 0.96 2.0
Germany 1.72 2.39
US 0.82 0.98
Table 7 proportion of expatriates with a Ph.D., and comparison with the
US labor market
The fraction of expatriates who have a Ph.D. is growing more rapidly
among expatriates than among americans. In 2000, it is 2 to 6 times higher
than in the US population. The phenomenon is even more salient if one only
looks at those who arrived in the US less than 10 years before the census.
The proportion of Ph.Ds among them can be as high as 10 % (Table 8).
1990 2000
Belgium 8.06 10.53
France 8.2 8.6
UK 5.4 5.3
Spain 4.0 9.4
Italy 2.9 8.6
Germany 4.9 6.8
US 0.82 0.98
Table 8 — Percentage of workers with PhDs among newly arrived workers
Assuming the average proportion of expatriates having Ph.D. will con-
verge to something like 10 %, which is an upper bound, that the proportion
of Ph.Ds in the source population is 0.5 % (about half the US level), and that
0.5—1 % of a typical European country’s citizens live in the United States, we
see that the share of a country’s Ph.Ds working in the US could go as far as
10-20 %. Furthermore, there are presumptions that these are more talented
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than the home country Ph.D., but it is very hard to measure from these data.
Finally, from the point of view of measuring the economic consequences of
the brain drain, we also want to know what the contributions of PhDs to
GDP is, both in Europe and in the US.
Suppose that, on the basis of Table 6, we speculate that, for any segment
of the distribution of income, the fraction of expatriates is twice higher in the
first quartile of the ability distribution than in the population as a whole, and
that we apply that to Ph.Ds. Then in our stylized example that would mean
that as many as 20-40 % of the 25 % best doctors could be in the United
States, depending on the total expatriation rate. Suppose now that we follow
Zucker et al (2003) and assume that those who really matter (in that they
exert significant externalities of innovation and firm creation) are the ”star”
people, which are the top 5 % of Ph.Ds (this is about the fraction of stars in
Zucker et al’s sample of biotechnologists); that would more or less correspond
to the top quartile of the top quartile. Under our extrapolation, that would
mean that 40-80 % of the European stars would be in the United States. A
potential implication, for example, is that the number of new products and
processes being invented in Europe would be about twice higher absent the
brain drain.
5 Wages
Education, as measured by the number of years, is of course not the only rel-
evant characteristic that people bring to the labor market. There are other
dimensions of skills that are not observable to the statistician (one of them
being the quality of education). How are Europeans selected according to
those dimensions? A natural way to answer that question is to estimate a
standard wage equation and enter dummies to find out if, given their observ-
able characteristics, Europeans earn more than their counterpart in the US
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labor market.
Table 9 reports the results of such a regression for both census years. The
”European premium” is uniformly positive and significant, ranging from 2
to 16 %. It is quite small for the German-born. During the nineties, it has
risen sharply for the French, the British, and moderately for the Spaniards.
It has fallen for Italians, Belgians, and Germans. These trends may be due
to changes in the distribution of expatriates’ unobservable characteristics or
to changes in the demand for specific goods they produce. It may also be
that average unobserved worker quality follows a different trend in the home
countries as compared to the US, but one does not see why this should be so
(trends in international comparisons of students achievements do not exhibit
such patterns). My favored explanation is that positive selection of migrants
in the dimension of unobservable worker quality has intensified during the
nineties, which may be explained by the general increase in the returns to
skills that has been documented in the US but is much less salient in Europe.
Country 1990 2000
France 4.9 (19.4) 10.7 (44.8)
Italy 16.7 (113.0) 11.5 (69.0)
Germany 3.12 (29.5) 2.14 (20.6)
United Kingdom 12.6 (99.1) 16.3 (135.7)
Spain 6.2 (17.15) 7.9 (24.3)
Belgium 15.1 (24.1) 13.8 (23.5)
Table 9 — Wage premia for European expatriates (%)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
A relevant question is: how does the wage premium vary across educa-
tional levels? Answering it would give valuable hints about the nature of
emigration. If the wage premium is higher for less educated workers, that
suggests that institutions in their home countries are not very good at remu-
nerating their skills, either because the educational system inadequately fails
12
to certify them (for example, a good mathematician does not find the ap-
propriate curriculum), or because the labor market works poorly at reward-
ing skills other than education (for example if there are binding collective
agreements who do not give ”points” for such skills). On the other hand,
if we find that the wage premium is higher for more educated workers, that
suggests that among the most educated, the better qualified have an even
greater probability to move to the US, confirming that selection operates
more strongly when one moves up the skill ladder. Such a finding would be
roughly consistent with the Borjas (1987) model of migration.
For this reason I have run wage regressions where the workforce is split
in only two educational categories (tertiary vs. not tertiary), and use an
interaction term between the tertiary education dummy and the place of
birth dummies. The results are reported in Table 10. Note that the estimated
premia are higher than when the specification corresponding to the preceding
Table is used. In 1990, the wage premium was higher for college graduates
than for other workers for the French-born and the British-born, and smaller
for others. In 2000, it is higher for all countries of origin. Hence, in 2000,
selection of the best workers is more intense among college-graduates than
among others.
Country 1990 2000
No tertiary Tertiary No tertiary Tertiary
France 9.8 14.6 12.4 23.3
Italy 9.1 7.25 9.0 9.0
Germany 8.7 5.0 6.15 7.8
United Kingdom 20.9 24.7 23.6 27.9
Spain 8.8 3.7 11.2 13.9
Belgium 24.2 19.2 16.9 26.2
Table 10 — Estimated wage premia for expatriates with and without ter-
tiary education.
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6 Entrepreneurs
In light of the view that the brain drain is a matter of concern because
a number of expatriates are exceptional individuals, we may ask wether en-
trepreneurs over-represented among expatriates. The following Table reports
the proportion of workers who have an entrepreneurial activity, and compares
it to the US labor market.
1990 2000
Belgium 13.18 11.51
France 10.67 11.39
UK 9.84 10.55
Spain 10.96 10.29
Italy 13.42 14.21
Germany 9.85 9.39
US 8.08 9.08
Table 11 — The proportion of entrepreneurs (%).
The proportion of entrepreneurs among expatriates is slightly higher than
among americans and is stable over time. How does it compare to the corre-
sponding proportion in the home country? While such a comparison should
be taken with caution, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2002) sug-
gests that it is about half lower in Europe than in the US. If one takes that
proportion seriously, then European expatriates are a bit more than twice
likely to be entrepreneurs than those who remain in Europe. That does
not, obviously, imply that they are very skilled, among them are shopkeep-
ers, taxi drivers, etc, and gives us no information on the relative quality of
European entrepreneurs based in the U.S. vs. those based in Europe. And
there are problems with comparing entrepreneurship data cross countries.
Nevertheless, these numbers are suggestive that a disproportionate fraction
of entrepreneurs are likely to emigrate to the U.S.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has provided a number of stylized facts about European-born
immigrants in the US labor market. We have found that their skill level
is substantially higher than in Europe, and that they compare favorably to
Americans of similar educational levels in terms of unobservable quality, since
there is a positive wage premium for European-born participants in the US
labor market. European expatriates also have a high employment rate and a
high proportion of entrepreneurs. They are several times more likely to have
a Ph.D. than the average U.S. labor market participants, and presumably
than the average European resident. The proportion of Ph.Ds among recent
expatriates can be as high as 10 %.
This highly biased composition of European expatriates has to be bal-
anced against their relative small numbers — about 0.5-1 % of the home
population. If one takes a rather homogeneous view of the labor market,
that suggest that the economic consequences of the brain drain on the home
country cannot be dramatic — it implies a moderate increase in inequality
and perhaps a 0.5 % reduction in GDP per capita. These numbers could
be considerably higher if one considers that a country’s potential for growth
and innovation is chiefly determined by key individuals — scientists, managers
and entrepreneurs — and that a large proportion of the most talented have
moved to the U.S.
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